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Abstract
Background—Prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) and pill mill laws were 
implemented to reduce opioid-related injuries/deaths. We evaluated their effects on high-risk 
prescribers in Florida.
Methods—We used IMS Health's LRx Lifelink database between July 2010 and September 2012 
to identify opioid-prescribing prescribers in Florida (intervention state, N: 38,465) and Georgia 
(control state, N: 18,566). The pre-intervention, intervention, and post-intervention periods were: 
July 2010–June 2011, July 2011–September 2011, and October 2011–September 2012. High-risk 
prescribers were those in the top 5th percentile of opioid volume during four consecutive calendar 
quarters. We applied comparative interrupted time series models to evaluate policy effects on 
clinical practices and monthly prescribing measures for low-risk/high-risk prescribers.
Results—We identified 1526 (4.0%) high-risk prescribers in Florida, accounting for 67% of total 
opioid volume and 40% of total opioid prescriptions. Relative to their lower-risk counterparts, they 
wrote sixteen times more monthly opioid prescriptions (79 vs. 5, p < 0.01), and had more 
prescription-filling patients receiving opioids (47% vs. 19%, p < 0.01). Following policy 
implementation, Florida's high-risk providers experienced large relative reductions in opioid 
patients and opioid prescriptions (−536 patients/month, 95% confidence intervals [CI] −829 to 
−243; −847 prescriptions/month, CI −1498 to −197), morphine equivalent dose (−0.88 mg/month, 
CI −1.13 to −0.62), and total opioid volume (−3.88 kg/month, CI −5.14 to −2.62). Low-risk 
providers did not experience statistically significantly relative reductions, nor did policy 
implementation affect the status of being high- vs. low- risk prescribers.
Conclusions—High-risk prescribers are disproportionately responsive to state policies. 
However, opioidsprescribing remains highly concentrated among high-risk providers.
Keywords
High-risk opioid prescribing; Prescription drug abuse; Prescription drug monitoring program; Pill 
mill law; Time series analysis
1. Introduction
Prescription opioid addiction and non-medical use are significant public health problems, 
responsible for about 44 daily overdose deaths in the United States (Kolodny et al., 2015; 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2015). From 2000 to 2010, large increases in opioid prescription among 
ambulatory and emergency visits coincided with reductions in use of non-opioid analgesics 
and an unchanging prevalence of pain among patients (Chang et al., 2014; Daubresse et al., 
2013). The burden of opioid-related morbidity has increased markedly over the past decade, 
with a 153% increase in the rate of opioid-related emergency department visits between 
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2004 and 2011 (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for 
Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2013). Similarly, the age adjusted death rate 
attributable to prescription opioids quadrupled between 1999 and 2009, surpassing that of 
stimulants, heroin, and other prescription drugs (Calcaterra et al., 2013). These problems are 
not limited to the United States; the United Kingdom and other European countries also face 
increasing use of opioids for non-cancer pain (Stannard, 2013), high number of individuals 
estimated to be addicted to prescription drugs (Dhalla et al., 2011b), and an increase in drug-
related deaths (Dhalla et al., 2011b; Giraudon et al., 2013).
Although there are no magic bullets to address these issues, policy makers play an important 
role in shaping regulatory, payment and public health policies to reduce opioid-related 
injuries and deaths (Dhalla et al., 2011b; Franklin et al., 2015; Giraudon et al., 2013; 
Lyapustina et al., 2016; Stannard, 2013; Stewart and Basler, 2013). Prescriber-oriented 
interventions, such as updating the guidelines on opioid prescription, have been adopted in 
many countries, but their penetration is unknown and following the guidelines is not 
mandatory (Giraudon et al., 2013). Establishing regulatory monitoring of prescription 
opioids has also been proposed in the United Kingdom (Stewart and Basler, 2013), and 
implemented at many states in the United States (Florida Office of the Attorney General, 
2015; United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2011). For 
example, state policy-makers in the United States have used prescription drug monitoring 
programs (PDMPs) and “pill mill” laws to address the prescription opioid epidemic. 
Although these state-sponsored programs are used for a variety of clinical, regulatory and 
educational purposes, a primary function of PDMPs is to give physicians, pharmacists and 
other health care providers access to patients’ prescription histories to improve identification 
and management of individuals at high risk of opioid abuse or diversion (United States 
Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Administration, 2011). In contrast, pill mill 
laws establish state-level regulatory oversight of pain management clinics, including the 
establishment of prescribing and dispensing requirements, and create penalties for those who 
do not comply with their requirements (United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). While there is growing 
evidence regarding the effect of these approaches on opioid sales (Haegerich et al., 2014; 
Rutkow et al., 2015), overdoses (Sauber-Schatz et al., 2013), and deaths (Delcher et al., 
2015), less is known about how they affect specific groups of prescribers. This is important, 
as approximately 20% of U.S. physicians are responsible for prescribing 80% of all opioid 
analgesics (Blumenschein et al., 2010; Dhalla et al., 2011a; Swedlow et al., 2011).
We previously demonstrated that Florida's PDMP and pill mill law were associated with 
modest decreases in opioid prescribing concentrated among providers with higher baseline 
opioid volume (Rutkow et al., 2015). However, in that analysis, which focused on Florida 
because of disproportionate levels of opioid-related morbidity and mortality in the state, we 
used a crude measure to characterize high-volume prescribers and limited our analysis to a 
select number of prescribing outcomes. In the current analysis, we use a rigorous method of 
identifying several groups of high-risk prescribers and, in addition to more fully 
characterizing them, we evaluate the effect of Florida's policies on their clinical practices, 
such as their total number of prescription-filling patients with an opioid prescription. 
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Furthermore, we characterize the concentration of opioid volume and prescriptions among 
this group of prescribers as well as how the policies of interest impact these measures.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Data
Using data from IMS Health's LifeLink LRx database, we examined anonymized, 
individual-level prescription claims, which represented approximately 65% of all retail 
prescription transactions in the United States. The data are automatically transmitted to IMS 
Health on a weekly basis from pharmacies in retail and food stores, as well as independent 
and mass merchandiser pharmacies. Claims data include National Drug Code (NDC)-level 
product information, quantity dispensed, days supply, payment source (Medicare, Medicaid, 
commercial insurer, or cash), and the five digit zip code of the dispensing pharmacy. Patient 
information includes sex, year of birth, and date of first entry into the data set. Prescriber 
information, derived from the American Medical Association masterfile, includes prescriber 
specialty and zip code.
2.2. Time segments and cohort derivation
Our analysis was based on a 12-month pre- and post-intervention observation period. The 
pre-intervention period extended from July 2010 through June 2011. The policy 
implementation period (i.e., intervention period) included the 3 months between July 2011 
through September 2011, representing the time during which Florida's PDMP and relevant 
aspects of its pill mill law were put into effect. The post-intervention period spanned 
October 2011 through September 2012.
Approximately 12 million individuals who filled at least one prescription in Florida or 
Georgia from July 2010 to September 2012 were identified. Among these individuals, we 
excluded 3.6 million individuals who filled prescriptions from stores that did not 
consistently report data to IMS Health throughout the study period (no reported data within 
the first three and last three month of the study period). We also excluded 4.3 million 
individuals (36%) without any pharmacy claims within three months of the first and last 
months of the study period. Furthermore, we excluded approximately 2% of transactions 
with erroneous or extreme values (e.g., negative quantities dispensed or transactions with 
morphine milligram equivalents (MME) exceeding 360 milligrams [mg] per transaction). In 
the end, we included 12.02 million eligible opioid prescriptions in the analysis.
From these opioid prescriptions, we identified 57,031 prescribers who had prescribed at least 
one opioid in Florida or Georgia in the 12-month pre-intervention period. Although we 
included non-physician prescribers such as dentists and nurse practitioners, we excluded 336 
veterinarians. To define high-risk prescribers, we divided the 12-month pre-intervention 
period into four quarters and calculated each prescriber's total opioid volume, the sum of 
MME associated with every transaction, during each quarter. In each state, we flagged 
prescribers who were in the top 5th percentile of opioid volume in each calendar quarter, and 
we defined high-risk prescribers as those who were flagged for each of the four pre-
intervention quarters. Low-risk prescribers were defined as those who did not qualify for the 
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high-risk category. We also examined two subsets of high-risk prescribers: (1) “high-risk/
high-prescription”: high-risk prescribers who were also in the top 5th percentile of the 
proportion of all prescriptions dispensed as opioids, across all four quarters during the pre-
intervention period, and (2) “high-risk/high-patient”: high-risk prescribers who were also in 
the top 5th percentile of the proportion of all prescription-filling patients receiving opioids, 
across all four quarters during the pre-intervention period. These four cohorts of prescribers 
and their respective numbers in Florida were: low-risk (n = 36,939), high-risk (n = 1,526), 
high-risk/high-prescription (n = 196), and high-risk/high-patient (n = 343).
We selected Georgia as a control state for this analysis due to its close geographic proximity 
to Florida, its similarity in baseline opioid utilization trends, and its absence of a PDMP or 
pill mill law during our analysis period.
2.3. Outcomes
We examined seven outcomes, each of which was derived on a monthly basis and 
summarized by group and state. First, we examined the total number of patients with any 
opioid prescription, a measure that suggests the extent to which providers are willing to 
prescribe opioids. Second, we calculated the proportion of prescriptions dispensed as opioids 
among all prescriptions, an indicator of the relative frequency of opioids among all 
prescriptions. Third, we derived the proportion of patients with at least one opioid 
prescription among all patients filling prescriptions, an indicator of the relative use of 
opioids among patients. Fourth, we quantified the average morphine milligram equilvalent 
(MME) per transaction, which provides a measure of opioid use within individual 
transactions. As MME increases, risk of opioid-related morbidity and mortality also 
increases (Chou et al., 2015). Fifth, we quantified total opioid volume prescribed using 
morphine equilvalent doses (MED). This measure considers differences in molecules, 
quantity and strength of doses dispensed, and provides a method of standardizing opioid 
prescriptions (Gwira Baumblatt et al., 2014; Nuckols et al., 2014). Sixth, we examined 
average days supply per transaction, since a greater days supply may lead to abuse, diversion 
and overdose. Seventh, we quantified the total number of opioid prescriptions dispensed, 
which could vary independently of measures such as total opioid volume or MME per 
transaction.
We also examined the probability of being a high-risk prescriber in the post-implementation 
period among four cohorts of prescribers (low-risk prescribers, high-risk prescribers, high-
risk/high-prescription prescribers, high-risk/high-patient prescribers), as well as the degree 
of opioid concentration (total opioid volume and number of opioid prescriptions) within 
high-risk prescribers prior to and following policy implementation.
2.4. Analysis
We conducted our analysis using a comparative interrupted time series framework. This 
method allowed us to correct for autocorrelation across time while determining the effect of 
Florida's laws on our outcomes of interest (Johnson et al., 2014). We derived our outcomes 
on a monthly basis but collated the three months required for policy implantation into one 
observation, resulting in 25 observations per state. These observations provided a 
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comparative change of monthly levels and trends in the outcomes between Florida and 
Georgia before and after Florida's policy changes.
We applied linear regression to the data, including two interaction terms: an interaction of 
the state indicator (FL or GA) and a period indicator (pre or post), representing the effect of 
the policies on the level of the outcome; and an interaction of the state indicator and a post-
intervention month indicator, representing the effect of the policies on the rate of change 
(trend). We adjusted for autocorrelation across time using the generalized Durbin-Watson 
test and included appropriate autocorrelation orders in our regression models. We ran one 
model separately for each cohort of prescribers.
We performed two main sensitivity analyses. First, we varied the length of observation for 
evaluating policy impact to 18 months and 6 months. Second, we varied the threshold to 
define high-risk prescribers (e.g., top 1%, 3%, 5%, etc. of total opioid volume in each of 
four consecutive pre-policy calendar quarters) and evaluated if changes in opioid 
concentration and high-risk status following policy implementation showed similar patterns 
across all thresholds.
The R2 of all models was higher than 0.80, reflecting large sample sizes and relatively little 
variation in the outcomes of interest over time. All analyses were completed using SAS 
version 9.4 (proc autoreg command with nlag function).
3. Results
3.1. Characteristics of high-risk prescribers
A total of 1,526 of 38,465 Florida prescribers (3.97%) were identified as high-risk; these 
prescribers accounted for 66.59% of the opioid volume and 39.99% of the total opioid 
prescriptions dispensed in Florida during the pre-intervention period. Prescribers with high 
opioid volumes during any one quarter had a high likelihood of having high opioid volumes 
during other three calendar quarters (Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.79–0.87). Nearly 
identical patterns were observed in Georgia, both with respect to the proportion of 
prescribers identified as high risk and the correlation between prescriber opioid volumes 
over time.
Table 1 provides characteristics of each risk cohort in Florida. High-risk prescribers wrote 
about five times the number of prescriptions (465 vs. 82 total monthly prescriptions) and 
sixteen times the number of opioid prescriptions (79 vs. 5 monthly opioid prescriptions) 
relative to their lower-risk counterparts. High-risk prescribers were more likely to be 
primary care physicians (54% vs. 25%), to have patients filling opioid prescriptions (47% 
vs. 19%), to have patients using Medicare Part D (29% vs. 16%) and to have cash-paying 
patients (7% vs. 4%). All these comparisons between low-risk and high-risk prescribers 
were statistically significant at p = 0.05 level.
High-risk/high-prescription and high-risk/high-patient subsets wrote fewer total 
prescriptions than other high-risk prescribers, but approximately 50% greater opioid 
prescriptions. These individuals tended to be Surgery, Anesthesia or Pain subspecialists, and 
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the proportion of their prescription-filling patients with an opioid prescription was over 80%, 
compared with 47% among all high-risk prescribers and 19% among low-risk prescribers.
3.2. Effect of policy changes stratified by prescriber risk
Table 2 reveals the impact of Florida's PDMP and pill mill law on prescribers by their 
baseline level of risk, as compared to Georgia. Across all four groups and seven outcomes, 
comparative changes in levels were not statistically significant. By contrast, there were 
clinically significantly relative reductions in monthly trends in many of the outcomes of 
interest among high-risk prescribers. For example, there was a monthly relative decline in 
number of patients with an opioid prescription of 536 patients/month (95% confidence 
interval [CI] −829 to −243), average morphine equivalent dose per transaction of −0.88 mg/
month/transaction (95% CI −1.13 to −0.62), a relative reduction in monthly total opioid 
volume of −3.88 kg/month (95% CI −5.14 to −2.62), and a relative decrease in number of 
opioid prescriptions of 847 prescription/month (95% CI − 1498 to −197). In contrast, there 
was a slight relative increase in average days’ supply of 0.02 days/month/transaction (95% 
CI 0.00–0.04). Among the low-risk prescribers, there were no statistically significant effects 
on the level or trend across all outcomes examined.
We observed fewer statistically significant policy effects among the high-risk/high-patient 
and high-risk/high-prescription prescribers, although both groups did experience statistically 
significantly relative reductions in monthly average morphine milligram equivalent (MME) 
and total opioid volume, with larger relative reductions among high-risk/high-patient 
prescribers (−0.84 [95% CIs −1.04, −0.64] vs. −0.27 [95% CIs −0.42,−0.11] mg/month/
transaction for morphine equivalent dose; −1.92 [95% CIs −2.66,−1.19] vs. −0.41 [95% CIs 
−0.70,−0.12] kg/month for total opioid volume).
Sensitivity analysis indicated similar results with varying lengths of observation 
(Appendices 1 and 2).
3.3. Observed versus predicted outcomes
Table 3 and the Fig. 1 show the difference between the observed outcomes and the predicted 
outcomes had Florida's PDMP and pill mill law not been implemented. Across all four 
groups, there was a greater difference between the observed and predicted outcomes during 
the second 6 months after the policy changes than during the first 6 months. For example, 
during the second 6 months, the observed MME was 13.7% and 4.9% less than the predicted 
values among high- and low-risk prescribers, respectively. However, these differences were 
only 5.7% and 0.1% less than predicted values during the first six months after the policy 
change. The largest difference in the impact of the policies between high-risk and low-risk 
prescribers was on total opioid volume (estimated policy effect at one year of a reduction of 
13.5% vs. an increase 11.1%) and morphine-equivalent dose (reduction of 9.6% vs. 1.2%), 
with smaller differences on outcomes such as number of opioid prescriptions and number of 
patients filling prescriptions who received an opioid. Between the two high-risk subgroups, 
there were larger impacts for the high-risk/high-patient group than the high-risk/high-
prescription group; for example, the policies were associated with 14.2% and 6.0% 
reductions in total opioid volume, respectively. Both high-risk subgroups had a small 
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increase in actual percentages of opioid prescription and patients with any opioid 
prescription relative to the predicted situation without the policy change.
3.4. Changes in opioid concentration and high-risk status following policy
The 4% of Florida prescribers who were characterized as high-risk accounted for a similar 
proportion of all opioids after the policy as before the policies were implemented (pre-policy 
opioid volume 66.59%, post-policy opioid volume 67.30%; pre-policy proportion of all 
opioid prescriptions 39.99%, post-policy proportion of all opioid prescriptions 41.36%). In 
other words, most prescribers – 99% of low-risk prescribers and 83% of high-risk 
prescribers – maintained their opioid-prescribing status from the pre- to post-implementation 
period.
Sensitivity analysis showed that the same patterns were observed across all thresholds to 
define being high-risk prescribers (Supplementary Material 3).
4. Discussion
We quantified the effect of Florida's PDMP and pill mill law on several populations of high-
risk prescribers. The 4% of prescribers who we deemed high-risk accounted for two-thirds 
of the opioid volume and two-fifths of the total opioid prescriptions dispensed in Florida 
during the pre-intervention period. Florida's PDMP and pill mill law were associated with 
statistically and clinically significantly relative reductions in four of the seven outcomes that 
we examined among high-risk prescribers, with virtually no effect on their lower-risk 
counterparts. Despite this, even following policy implementation, prescribing remained 
highly concentrated among these same high-risk providers.
These results are important in light of the magnitude of injuries and deaths associated with 
opioid use, as well as the interest policy-makers and other stakeholders have in interventions 
such as PDMPs and pill mill laws to address these outcomes. The effect of such policies is 
of particular interest in states such as Florida, which experienced one of the most rapid 
increases in opioid-related morbidity and mortality during the decade prior to policy 
implementation (Florida Office of the Attorney General, 2015). During that time, Florida 
also epitomized the extreme differences in the extent to which providers prescribe opioids: 
in 2010, 98 of the 100 highest opioid prescribers in the nation were practicing in Florida 
(Johnson et al., 2014). Here, we extend prior work by rigorously identifying and 
characterizing subgroups of high-risk prescribers as well as quantifying the effect of the 
policy changes of interest on outcomes such as the composition of their patient panels.
Our finding that high-risk opioid prescribers are disproportionately responsive to state 
policies allows for policy-makers to understand the population of prescribers whose 
behavior is most likely to be affected by state policies such as PDMPs and Pill Mill laws. 
Not all prescribers are affected equally. To the degree that these policies are intended to 
target the outlying prescribers, they appear to be working. Nonetheless, important questions 
remain regarding many dimensions of these programs, but that reductions are concentrated 
in the highest volume prescribers is of interest. Another finding regarding the high 
concentration of opioid prescribing on the same prescribers even following policy 
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implementation suggests the suitability and importance of other regulatory, payment or 
enforcement interventions that target small subsets of prescribers.
In addition to the evaluation of the overall policy impact, many studies have focused on 
patient-level predictors of opioid abuse and diversion (Gwira Baumblatt et al., 2014; 
Paulozzi et al., 2012). Furthermore, prescribing guidelines have been increasingly 
scrutinized and reevaluated (Nuckols et al., 2014). Despite this, data on provider-level 
factors predicting inappropriate prescribing have been more limited. Our findings highlight 
that a small subset of high-risk prescribers are responsible for prescribing a vastly 
disproportionate fraction of the opioids in circulation today (Chou et al., 2015); although 
policies may decrease the overall volume of opioids on the market, they do not alter this 
heavily concentrated pattern.
Surprisingly, we found fewer effects among subpopulations of prescribers who were defined 
not only by high opioid volume at baseline, but also by a high proportion of patients or 
prescriptions accounted for by opioids. Our sample sizes in these subgroups were much 
smaller and thus we may have had insufficient statistical power to discern changes that took 
place. In addition, these prescribers may have had a greater tendency to be writing clinically 
appropriate prescriptions (e.g., different patient case-mix) and thus they may have been less 
vulnerable to the effects of the policies examined.
Since Florida implemented its PDMP and pill mill law around the same time, we are not 
able to statistically disentangle the effects of these two policies. The implementation of 
Florida's pill mill law allowed law enforcement agents to raid clinics, seize assets, and make 
arrests, resulting in the closure of approximately 250 pill mills in the state by 2013 and 
reducing the state's share of the nation's top oxycodone prescribers from 98 in 2010–0 in 
2013 (Johnson et al., 2014). By contrast, the PDMP has allowed for providers to access 
patients’ prescribing histories at the point of care, and for enforcement to use PDMP data for 
active investigations. Although the policies were designed with different goals in mind, both 
policies likely contributed to the changes we observed.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, our analysis was limited to retail prescription 
claims which, while capturing the majority of opioid transactions, nonetheless excludes sales 
from direct physician dispensing – which was forbidden by the pill mill law starting in July 
2011 – as well those occurring in settings such as hospitals, nursing homes, and other 
institutions. The absence of data capturing physician dispensing may lead us to 
underestimate the effect of Florida's policies. Second, our data source prevented us from 
assessing whether transactions were clinically indicated or were associated with opioid-
related morbidity or mortality. Our methods of identifying high-risk prescribers are 
imprecise and intended for screening purposes and are not intended to indicate the legality or 
quality of any individual providers’ prescribing behavior. Despite this, our methods have 
face and construct validity and, given the ubiquity of automated data and the magnitude of 
the epidemic, these approaches will remain important in the coming decade (Cepeda et al., 
2012; Paulozzi et al., 2014). Third, while our derivation of a closed cohort of stores and 
patients reduced the bias introduced from an open cohort, it limited the number of 
observations available for analysis. Finally, we were unable to identify the independent 
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effects of Florida's PDMP and pill mill laws given that they were enacted within a few 
months of each another.
High-risk opioid prescribers are a unique group of providers who consistently prescribe 
higher opioid volumes than their peers and are responsible for having prescribed a 
disproportionate fraction of the opioids in circulation today. We found that the prescribing 
behavior of the small subset of Florida prescribers who were high-risk was significantly 
affected by Florida's PDMP and pill mill law, while low-risk providers were not similarly 
impacted. Despite this, even following policy implementation, opioid prescribing remained 
highly concentrated, suggesting continued opportunities to strategically target initiatives to 
reduce opioid use and, ultimately, opioid-related morbidity and mortality.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
Acknowledgements
The statements, findings, conclusions, views, and opinions contained and expressed in this article are based in part 
on data obtained under license from the following IMS Health Incorporated information service(s): IMS Health 
LifeLink LRx Database® (2010–2012), IMS Health Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. The statements, findings, 
conclusions, views, and opinions contained and expressed herein are not necessarily those of IMS Health 
Incorporated or any of its affiliated or subsidiary entities.
Funding
This work was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Public Health Law Research Program and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under Cooperative Agreement U01CE002499. The funding sources had 
no role in the design and conduct of the study, analysis, or interpretation of the data; and preparation or final 
approval of the manuscript prior to publication. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely of the author(s) 
and should not be construed as representing the opinions of CDC or any agency of the Federal Government.
References
Blumenschein, K.; Fink, J.; Freeman, P.; Kirsh, K.; Steinke, D.; Talbert, J. Independent Evaluation of 
the Impact and Effectiveness of the Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting 
Program (KASPER). Frankfort, Kentucky: 2010. 
Calcaterra S, Glanz J, Binswanger IA. National trends in pharmaceutical opioid related overdose 
deaths compared to other substance related overdose deaths: 1999–2009. Drug Alcohol Depend. 
2013; 131:263–270. [PubMed: 23294765] 
Cepeda MS, Fife D, Berlin JA, Mastrogiovanni G, Yuan Y. Characteristics of prescribers whose 
patients shop for opioids: results from a cohort study. J. Opioid Manage. 2012; 8:285–291.
Chang HY, Daubresse M, Kruszewski SP, Alexander GC. Prevalence and treatment of pain in EDs in 
the United States, 2000–2010. Am. J. Emerg. Med. 2014; 32:421–431. [PubMed: 24560834] 
Chou R, Turner JA, Devine EB, Hansen RN, Sullivan SD, Blazina I, Dana T, Bougatsos C, Deyo RA. 
The effectiveness and risks of long-term opioid therapy for chronic pain: a systematic review for a 
National Institutes of Health Pathways to Prevention Workshop. Ann. Intern. Med. 2015; 162:276–
286. [PubMed: 25581257] 
Daubresse M, Chang HY, Yu Y, Viswanathan S, Shah ND, Stafford RS, Kruszewski SP, Alexander GC. 
Ambulatory diagnosis and treatment of nonmalignant pain in the United States, 2000–2010. Med. 
Care. 2013; 51:870–878. [PubMed: 24025657] 
Delcher C, Wagenaar AC, Goldberger BA, Cook RL, Maldonado-Molina MM. Abrupt decline in 
oxycodone-caused mortality after implementation of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Program. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2015; 150:63–68. [PubMed: 25746236] 
Chang et al. Page 10













Dhalla IA, Mamdani MM, Gomes T, Juurlink DN. Clustering of opioid prescribing and opioid-related 
mortality among family physicians in Ontario. Can. Fam. Phys. 2011a; 57:e92–96.
Dhalla IA, Persaud N, Juurlink DN. Facing up to the prescription opioid crisis. BMJ. 2011b; 
343:d5142. [PubMed: 21862533] 
Florida Office of the Attorney General. Florida's Prescription Drug Diversion and Abuse Roadmap. 
2015:2012–2015.
Franklin G, Sabel J, Jones CM, Mai J, Baumgartner C, Banta-Green CJ, Neven D, Tauben DJ. A 
comprehensive approach to address the prescription opioid epidemic in Washington State: 
milestones and lessons learned. Am. J. Public Health. 2015; 105:463–469. [PubMed: 25602880] 
Giraudon I, Lowitz K, Dargan PI, Wood DM, Dart RC. Prescription opioid abuse in the UK. Br. J. 
Clin. Pharmacol. 2013; 76:823–824. [PubMed: 23594290] 
Gwira Baumblatt JA, Wiedeman C, Dunn JR, Schaffner W, Paulozzi LJ, Jones TF. High-risk use by 
patients prescribed opioids for pain and its role in overdose deaths. JAMA Intern. Med. 2014; 
174:796–801. [PubMed: 24589873] 
Haegerich TM, Paulozzi LJ, Manns BJ, Jones CM. What we know, and don't know, about the impact of 
state policy and systems-level interventions on prescription drug overdose. Drug Alcohol Depend. 
2014; 145:34–47. [PubMed: 25454406] 
Johnson H, Paulozzi L, Porucznik C, Mack K, Herter B. Decline in drug overdose deaths after state 
policy changes—Florida, 2010–2012. MMWR. 2014; 63:569–574. [PubMed: 24990490] 
Kolodny A, Courtwright DT, Hwang CS, Kreiner P, Eadie JL, Clark TW, Alexander GC. The 
prescription opioid and heroin crisis: a public health approach to an epidemic of addiction. Annu. 
Rev. Public Health. 2015; 36:559–574. [PubMed: 25581144] 
Lyapustina T, Rutkow L, Chang HY, Daubresse M, Ramji AF, Faul M, Stuart EA, Alexander GC. 
Effect of a pill mill law on opioid prescribing and : the case of Texas. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2016; 
159:190–197. [PubMed: 26778760] 
Nuckols TK, Anderson L, Popescu I, Diamant AL, Doyle B, Di Capua P, Chou R. Opioid prescribing: 
a systematic review and critical appraisal of guidelines for chronic pain. Ann. Intern. Med. 2014; 
160:38–47. [PubMed: 24217469] 
Paulozzi LJ, Kilbourne EM, Shah NG, Nolte KB, Desai HA, Landen MG, Harvey W, Loring LD. A 
history of being prescribed controlled substances and risk of drug overdose death. Pain Med. 2012; 
13:87–95. [PubMed: 22026451] 
Paulozzi LJ, Mack KA, Hockenberry JM. Vital signs: variation among states in prescribing of opioid 
pain relievers and benzodiazepines—United States, 2012. MMWR. 2014; 63:563–568. [PubMed: 
24990489] 
Rutkow L, Chang HY, Daubresse M, Webster DW, Stuart EA, Alexander GC. Effect of florida’s 
prescription drug monitoring program and pill mill laws on opioid prescribing and use. JAMA 
Intern. Med. 2015; 175:1642–1649. [PubMed: 26280092] 
Sauber-Schatz EK, Mack KA, Diekman ST, Paulozzi LJ. Associations between pain clinic density and 
distributions of opioid pain relievers drug-related deaths, hospitalizations, emergency department 
visits, and neonatal abstinence syndrome in Florida. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2013; 133:161–166. 
[PubMed: 23769424] 
Stannard C. Opioids in the UK: what's the problem? BMJ. 2013; 347:f5108. [PubMed: 23950198] 
Stewart G, Basler MH. Wanted: national regulatory monitoring system for long term opioid 
prescription. BMJ. 2013; 347:f5586. [PubMed: 24048304] 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics 
and Quality. Highlights of the 2011 Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) Findings on Drug-
Related Emergency Department Visits. 2013. http://archive.samhsa.gov/data/2k13/DAWN127/
sr127-DAWN-highlights.htm
Swedlow, A.; Ireland, J.; Johnson, G. Prescribing Patterns of Schedule II Opioids Part 2: Fentanyl 
Prescriptions in California Workers’ Compensation. 2011. http://www.cwci.org/research.html
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Menu of Pain Management Clinic Regulation. 2012. http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/menu-pmcr.pdf
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
National Vital Statistics System Mortality Data. 2015. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/deaths.htm
Chang et al. Page 11













United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. State Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs: Questions and Answers. 2011. http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/
rx_monitor.htm
Chang et al. Page 12














Effect of Florida's Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and Pill-Mill Law on Opioid 
Prescribing Volume Among Prescribers Stratified by Baseline Risk.
Chang et al. Page 13

























Chang et al. Page 14
Table 1




Prescribers N = 
36,939
High-Risk 
Prescribers N = 
1526







    Average monthly prescriptions, N 82.23 464.78 195.76 226.71
    Average monthly opioid prescriptions, N 4.92 79.34 119.29 120.85
Provider Specialty, %
    Dentist 18.21 0 0 0
    Emergency Medicine 4.24 1.31 0.51 0.87
    NMD 4.13 0 0 0
    Other 25.65 14.68 15.31 22.45
    Primary Care 25.4 54.26 8.67 12.54
    Psychiatry/Neurology 3.96 5.5 0 2.62
    Surgery/Anesthesia/Pain 18.42 24.25 75.51 61.52
Patient characteristics
b
    Monthly patients with any prescription, N 37.26 164.97 100.41 101.12
    Monthly patients with opioid prescription, N 4.17 59.57 84.02 84.38
    Monthly prescriptions per patient, N 1.72 2.68 1.98 2.29
    Monthly opioid prescriptions per patient, N 0.75 1.35 1.48 1.48
    Proportion of opioids among all prescriptions, % 13.01 27.7 62.23 55.63
    Proportion of patients with an opioid prescription, % 18.68 46.77 83.09 83.37
Payment characteristics for opioid prescriptions
b
    Monthly patients with an opioid cash payment, N 0.27 3.94 4.14 5.41
    Monthly opioids paid in cash, % 4.26 7.06 5.62 7.7
    Monthly opioids paid through Medicaid, % 3.75 5 2.28 3.8
    Monthly opioids paid through Medicare Part D, % 15.52 28.62 26.57 25.05
    Monthly opioids paid through Commercial Insurer, 
%
41.62 59.29 65.53 63.45
Prescribing risk status after policy change
b
    Low-Risk Prescribers, % 99.13 16.91 6.12 10.79
    High-Risk Prescribers, % 0.82 83.09 93.88 89.21
Source: IMS Health Lifelink LRx Data, 2010–2012.
a
High-risk prescribers were those who in four consecutive quarters were in the 95th percentile or higher regarding total opioid volume; “high 
prescription” based on individuals who also were also in 95th percentile or higher on fraction of all prescriptions dispensed as opioids; “high 
patient” based on prescribers who were in 95th percentile or higher on fraction of all prescription filling patients receiving opioids.
b
There were statistically significant differences between high-risk and low-risk prescribers at 0.05 level.
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Table 2
Impact of florida's pdmp and pill mill law on monthly outcomes among high-risk and low-risk prescribers.
Low-Risk Prescribers 
N = 36,939
High-Risk Prescribers N 
= 1526
Subset of High-Risk Prescribers
High-Prescription N = 
196
High-Patient N = 343
Comparative Change in 
Levels
Opioid Patients, N −4211 (−10932,2510) −524 (−2799,1752) −89 (−794,616) 71 (−1233,1375)
Opioid Prescriptions, % of all 
prescriptions
−0.27 (−1.07,0.53) 0.25 (−0.54,1.04) 0.67 (−0.61,1.94) 0.37 (−0.57,1.30)
Opioid Patients, % of all 
patients
−0.05 (−0.48,0.37) 0.09 (−0.43,0.60) 0.42 (−0.39,1.24) 0.41 (−0.34,1.16)
Morphine Equivalent Dose, 
mg
0.26 (−3.31,3.83) −0.07 (−1.59,1.44) −1.01 (−2.10,0.09) −0.54 (−1.87,0.78)
Total Opioid Volume, kg 3.51 (−7.02,14.02) 1.56 (−8.13,11.25) 0.34 (−2.03,2.71) 1 (−4.46,6.47)
Days' Supply 0.01 (−0.04,0.03) 0.13 (−0.01,0.26) 0.08 (−0.11,0.28) 0.03 (−0.10,0.15)
Opioid Prescriptions, N −4322 (−13036,4392) −996 (−5782,3791) 2 (−1068,1071) 471 (−1824,2766)
Comparative Change in 
Monthly Trends








Opioid Prescriptions, % of all 
prescriptions
−0.06 (−0.19,0.07) −0.08 (−0.20,−0.03) 0.07 (−0.12,0.25) −0.03 (−0.17,0.10)
Opioid Patients, % of all 
patients
−0.04 (−0.11,0.04) −0.08 (−0.16,0.00) 0.05 (−0.07,0.17) 0.07 (−0.04,0.18)






















0.02 (0.00,0.05) −0.01 (−0.02,0.01)




−30 (−160,101) −279 (−588,30)
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